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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
LOGAN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
JACK CROFT and LUCILLE
CROFT,
Defendants-Respondents

Case No.

9629

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
We desire to bring .to the attention ,,of the Court,
some additional facts which Appellant's statement omits,
in order to present a clearer picture of the factual situation.
Presently, the area immediately surrounding Respondents' home is exclusively a residential district,
occupied mostly by new or near new homes. (Note: all
references will be to the transcript of testimony). The
school to be built will house all the children of Logan of
junior high school age with the usual attendant annoyances, from increased activities due to buses, bicycles, private automobiles, recess activities, band practices, and
other disquieting features incident to the operation of
such a public institution (Tr. 57 thru 61).
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The witness,--' G.· Frank Raymond, who- is A~sistant
Superintendent_ (Tr. 57) -;of,

Pl~intiff,

on.-cr.oss examin-

ation. said .in reference to the Croft home after .the
construction and

~peration

of the

schoo~:

"Mayb,e_ I .

wouldn't (want to live that close). And that he would
rather be a\~dy· (Tr.~6o)>:M:eaning ·that he would\·ather
have his ~wn hou{e away,fromthe scho~l.
Witness J. B .. Gunnelt (Tr~ 77 thru80) testified that
the proposed. school as. shown by

th~

JI],ap On page 3 of

Plaintiff''s brief would lesson the value of the Croft
home to the extent of $4,000.00. That he was an appraiser
fot> the Federal Housing Administration (Tr. 69), and
that the schoofwould force the Croft home to be classified under· the term '' inhaimonious use'', and this would
cause the FHA to reject. it for insurance. And further;
94) "Q.
¥ow, you ill;dicated tha~ this diminution in
. .
value of the actual reside,nce by reason of the construe-~
ti~n of the school to the north has a twelve per cent diminution in value or severance damage~ A. Yes.''

<rl?.

~·

,

''

.

·-

The' ju:ry viewecl the premises (Tr. ·l~~:J24) and
heard the evidence, in relation t.o the damage to the Croft
hon1e. While no part of the school building. as presently
planned will be .on property taken from the Crofts, ·the
over~ll in~tallation does call-for a car parking lot {p. 3.; ·
Plaintiff's brief) locate(f,over the West portion of the ·
land taken from the Crofts.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
The lower court did not err in instructing the jury
on Question No. 3 of the Special Verdict.
In answer to the first reason cited by plaintiff for
error in the submission of the third question to the jury
the defendants point out the differences in the constitutions of the United States ~nd Utah. In the 5th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States it is said,
"Nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation''~',while tl~e Utah Co~stitu-.
tion states that "private property shall not be taken or
dr;tmaged ( 9urs) ..for publi~ ~se ~ithout j~st compenstion.". The inclusion of the. word "damages" must be
given meaning. In :lB. Am. J~r, page 763 it i~ stated that
the most obvious interpre.tation of this word, "damaged",
is that there may be compensation awarded for land not
taken but which has peen depreciated by the taking and
proposed construction on the land. Utah has elaborated
on this constitutional p.rovision by enacting Section 7834-10, U.C.A., 1953,. where it states in Par. (3) that the
jury must ascertain and assess damages '' ( 3' If the
property though no part is taken, will be damaged by the
construction of the proposed improvement, the amount
of such damages". Nowhere does it state that the proposed improvement must be entirely upon the property
of the condemnee.
-~ I

.

:.

.

'

'

'

'

~

f

•'
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In the case of L. A. '&,• S. L .. RR. Co. vs. Board of
Education of Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 13, 99 P. 263, it
washeld that the school board was entitled to damages
to the remainder of its property where there was condemnation of partof theland. It must be presumed that
the railroad comes from somewhere and goes

som~where

and therefore the. damages accrue because of the use by
the railroad along the entire track and not just the use
upon the portion condemned. This view is generally
taken where it is difficult to separately ascertain the
amount. of damages, and because of this difficulty the
court's have held that the land owner is entitled to recover. for damages resulti~g to the_ remainder of his estate by the uses made' or tobe made of the lands acquired
from, third persons for the same undertaking. See Haggard v. Independent School Dist. 1901, Iowa, 85 N.W. 777.
Also .170. A. L. R. beginning
721 to 728. What are the
,.
d~m.ages caused by a section of a railroad track, a portion of a street, or a portion of a school? It seems quite
reasonable that the construction of the total project as
a unit must be lo~ked to in order to determine the damages, .and 'wnell. these d~mages ,are dis~in~t from those
sustained by the remaind~r of the neighborhood then the
damage is one allowed by the common law and the statutorylaw of this St~te.
•~

'

•

•

,I

I

'

-

This Court in State v. District Court, Fourth Judical District 94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502 this CQurt said:
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''This court has heretofore said that under the
provisions of the Constitution of this state, a party, whose property is about to be specially damaged in any substantial degtee for public use,
has the same righta and is given the same remidies
for the protection of his property from the threatened injury. as would be accorded him if his
property were actually taken and appropriated
for such use." (citing Stockdale v. Rio Grande
Western Railway Co. 28 Utah 201, 77 P. 849.)
Further citing 1 Lewis on Eminent Domain (2nd Ed)
57, it said:
"T~e law, as t9 what C()nstitute~ a taking, has
been undergoing radical changes in the last few
yearS. And the great weight of the more recent
judicial-authority, which we believe to be aupported by the _better reason, and which is more in accord with our ideas of equity and natural justice,
holds- that any substantial 1nterference with private property which destroys or materially les- sens its yalue, or by which. ~he owner's right to
its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed, is, in fact and in law,
a taking; in the constitutional sense, to the extent
of the damage suffered, even though the title
and possession of the owner remain undisturbed.''

The_ framers of· the fundamental law, after
much debate and careful consideration of the
hardship of the old rule which allowed compensation only in the case of a taking of prope·rty,
wrote into the Constitution a provision by which
we think they intended to guarantee to the landowner wh()se property is damaged just compensation with the same certainty as to the landowner
whose property is physically taken.''
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See also,Blesch v. Chicago & N. W. RR. 2 N.W. 113,
(Wis.).
Secondly, the plaintiff claims that defendants are
not entitled to make a claim against the plaintiff for
such damages to· propeTty though no part is taken as
this would in effect be a suit against a governmental body
which enjoys immunity. The point is not well taken as
this reasonin~ would bar any defendant from asserting
damages in excess of the offer made by the plaintiff.
In the prayer for relief contained in the complaint of
the plaintiff there is the_ following: ''that compensation
aJ!d. da!llage })e assessed for the takin,g of. the, said lands
for such~ proposeq use''. Under the theory proposed by
ph;tintiff the defendant 4as no right to ask for da;rnages
for the_ §~ver~nce ,of the smaller. parcel from the larger
parceland also for damages which accrue to the property
not taken by reason of the construction of the proposed
school with all its fa~ilities. The defendant cannot be
bound by the allegations and prayer of the plaintiff as
the plaintiff would then have the ability to dictate whether or not~ the defendant should have damages as outlined in our statutes, and the concept of just compensation for property taken or damaged would be mere fiction.
The Courts that have held- that the persons whose
l~rld is damaged but n~t taken have no. right of action,
hold so because:, (1) tl~eir constitutiolls _do not allow for
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the award of darnage.s but award damages for only the
taking; (2) the individual cannot sue the political body.
However in Haggard v. Independent School District,
supra,

th~

court there said by inference tha( an action

by the school board for condemnation opened the door
for a claim by the defendant for all the damages sustained by them which were allowed by the laws of the
juristdiction.

The Utah cases cited, by th~ pl~intiff can he distil}.-.
quished in that they pertain to ,origi:p.al ac,~ions b:r;ought _
by individuals against a ((OU.D:~Y or otP:er political ~ubdiv- _
isions. Th,e case_ of ._Springville :Banking Co. y._ Burton,
10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P. 2d 157 can be rec~;ncil~q in_t:Q.a~ the
plaintiff there sought to . bring _a Mandamus action to
compel the state to pay da111ages there})y seeking to do
. something indirectly that he could not do directly. Whereas in our case the action was started by the School
Board an<;l the defendants claim damages under the provisions of the constitution of the state and the statutes
controlling condemnation actions. Here ·the defendants
have pursued a right givell. to them by the Constitution
and the laws of this st~te. ,Again re~erring to the. case
of State v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, supra, this Court said :
"We think is is clear that the framers of the.
Constitution did not intend to give the rights
granted by Section 22, and then leave the citizen
powerless to enforce such rights. We· held that
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this is so .whether the injury complained . of by
the "plaintiff in the injunction suit is considered
a. 'taking' of the property, or a 'damaging' of
property."' ·.
.
''We think if a case atises where there is no
other method of enforcing a constitutional right
except by suit against the State, then is must be
considered that the State has given its consent to
be sued in such a case.''
Cases in other jurisdictions state by inference that
the tight to ;ask for damages ;other than set forth in the
complaint of the plaintiff is conceded by the plaintiff
when it filed the complaint that brings the action to condemn. See Haggard v. Independant School District, supra:, where the court said:
''I:rtcase of.condeinllation for railway purposes,
compensation for depreciation in the value of the
~-,remainder of the tract due to the proximity of the
railroad operated in the usual and proper manner, and the inconvenience and annoyance result- :ing therefrom (is allowed). We see no reason,
·ihexefore, why the inconvenience due to the proximity of a school house, as affecting the market
value_ of. appellee's residence property, should
not be taken into account."
· The Iowa Court allowed the defendant to have damages not only for the taking and severance by also for
the diminution in value of the property, without the
holding that the plaintiff could not be sued and that the
claim for additional damages wa_s ·doing indirectly what
could not be done directly.
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It is a fact that the School· Board in -our cas-e consented to the claim of defendants for additional assessment of compensation and darruiges. I-Iow else can a
pal'ty

g~in

the '' ju~t

compensfL~iq;n.-,.and. d~a~.ea''

as set

forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of 78--34-10 U. G. A., if he
c~nnot allege the damages he

is :entitled

to when the '

same is not set forth in the complaint of th~ plaintiff.
This is not a separate action against the political body
or a counterclaim but a prayer for relief as provided
for in our constitution and statutes, and a, riglJ.t that tl1.e
courts of this State have preserved.
Plaintiff's third reason for error on Point 1 'is that ·
for consequential dama~es or spedial daniag~s.to be s~s
stained they must be that recognized at comw-on law. In
18 American Jurisprudence at ·page 756 it is stated that
for the da~age to be actionabie there ~u~t be a d:istinc- ;
tion between the damage suffere~ by· the residents of the "
neighborhood and the defendant. On page 96-97 of the
transcript, witness Gunnell state~ that the homes'on the
opposite sige, ?f ~he ,~treet will, ~gffer ;no .damage. And-·
Mr. Baugh, a witness for plaintiff (Tr; 2G4t states that
the homes on the opposite side of the street.-wiU be enhanced and that the lots and the home to the south of
:Mr.· Croft· will not· be damaged. Thu,s the record. shows
that the defendants home is the only .one in the neighbor-·
hood that will ·be depreciated by. ,the construction. of .the
school. This is truly within the Jetter ofrthe ~ommo.n.
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law, as the house of defendants is· the only uninsurable
house for F. H. A. purposes in the area for inharmonous
use.
Plaintiff cites the case of Richert v. The Board of
Education of the City of Newton, 117 Kan. 502, 280 P.
2d 596. This case can be distinguished in that the proper:ty owner brought the action, and none of his property
was taken; also Richert relied upon the Federal Constitution which omits the provision for "damages", as
l(ansas does not have provision in their .constitution
pertaining to the taking of land. The Schuler v. Wilson,
153, N. E. 737, 48 A. L. R. 1027 case is similar. In these
cases the courts seem to hinge the claim for consequential damages upon a condemnation action being started
by the governmental body. We do not claim that this
is the law in this state in view of our decisions. but
state that an action for condemnation of a part of
land serves as a basis for a claim for damages to the
remainder,
even. though the damages acrue as a result
.
.
of construction of the project upon the lands of other
persons, where said damages cannot be separated and
as~ertain~d.
POINT 2
The second error raised by the plaintiff is that the
trial court allowed in evidence an exhibit showing a proposed subdivision planned by the defendants and two
others. We might state at the outset of this argument that
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at no time did any witness for the .defendants value ,the
individual lots and then add those sums fer a totai· valuation of the property.
It is a weli recognized concept of the law 'of eminent
dodtain that the proper criteria for the determination

of

corhp~msation is 'in~ ma~ket value o:f\he pr~perty, wllich is the ''highest price estimated in terms of money ~liich
I

,

;.

'

"

,

it would bring if exposed for ~ale- in th~ open mark~t.
;.
with a reasonable time allowed in which to find a pur-J'1;,
chaser, buying with knowledge o!f all the u~es-anc1 pur-·
poses to which it was adapted and for which is w~s cap_:.~
)•

'

'

able . . . " 29 C. J. S. 97 4. The plans offered by Jl1e de~
fendants and received· by the t;i~l Cou~t .~~o~. t~1;1-t t~e,
land is capable of being· used ·as. ~- _ sribdi~is1on~ .M::r~ Croft .
on page 120 of the transcript testified thf1t' it wovlq ~e _
possible to design a subdivision J~ntirely upop ~i~: OW:P. ' ;
land. Witness Gunnell testified that· :the pro,perty is
line ~0. Mr. Baugh
best suited for a subdivision, Tr~ ]0.at
.
·a witness for the- plaintiff. testified on page 199 of. the_
transcript that. he v:;t~ued. the. lan¢l r.as. property capable
of b~ing sub-divided. witn:ess :B:~ugh ,.als~ testifie;d
.. ltJ:wA
; ,' .,
._f-_
1,.'

'

\

.,

•1

,'

,'

I

.

'

he felt that Mr. Croft ;shou~d b~ ~onpens:ated according ,
to the basis of other simil8.r purchases in the area during
the time; of- discussion, (Tr. 206,) and ~on ~page ·2:1~7- ofiilhe
Tr. that he was aware of the sale of. ~and: JH~~t~ d~r ;l;Q ~
the south .for about $8-,000 per: acre~ and he also testified: ...
that.in his opinion there was little diff~rence betw.eerr th~ ,
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value of the inside and the outside lots. The exhibit complained of by the plaintiff shows defendants comparable land also sold, and comparability of the values.
The sale Mr. Baugh referred to came about in an
unusual manner. (See map- p. 3 plaintiff's brief). This
was the Nichols property and the subject of the conde~nnation in a separate suit filed the same day as ours.
The two.
cases were consoladated for trial. On the
. \
'
.
morning of the trial, the attorney for Nichols announced
that the School Board had effected a voluntary settlement with ,Nichols. The attorneys for plaintiff agreed,
and that case was dismis$ed or ·otherwise disposed of.
The. price voluntary paid to Nichols (which Mr. Baugh
referred ot) would no doubt, have some influence on the
jury. These facts do not appear in the record of our
case, but we think that opposing counsel will agree that
these facts are a matter of record in the. District Court
below.
Plans showing subdivisions have been allowed into
evidence without error; State vs. Peek et al, 1 Utah 2d
263, 265 P. 2d 630. It appears in that case, without comment by this' Court that there were lands not owned by the
condemnee shown· on the map, where there were dipicted
established subdivisions and proposed subdivisions. We
can see ·no difference between the plat there and the plat
hi the instant case as both plats showed an are·a greater
than that ·condemned and showed proposed improve-
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ments. In the case of Daly City v. Smith; 243. P ..2d 46,
the California Appellate Court said that, '~the court
made it clear that. evidence of propqse<;I il)).prQ::vem~nts," ,
may be admissable to show adaptability of the land for
that use, but it cannot' be adillit'ted •. to ~how enhanced
loss because the owner is prohibited .from carryi:rig out
that particular ·imt>'rovem~nt.'' The Cobrt:lie're'was': ob"'
viously referring to multiply!ng: the profit per let
times the number of lots. This·'oilr defendants did not
do. Any discussion of lots found' in the reco-rd was :first
propounded by the plaintiff, aild, he· cBrtainly c3;nnot complain of his own questiorls and answers received
therefore as error. Also there is no testimony in the- ·
record produced by the defendab.t showing the loss·: Mr:
Croft has suffered by reason of 'his inabliity to put his
plan in to use.

~:Upra;
The plat in this case, as ori 'the P~ek
shows an intended use. The cithition by the plaintiff out
of 18 Am. Jur. 991 is not the law in this state, as any pi~t
must show an intended use, and therefore the plaintiff is· ·
in effect asserting that all plats are inadmissible as they ·
show·a use intended for the future. How·else c~na-de;,t
fendant in a ·condemnation ·action show: :either ·by testi"',
mony and documentary "evidence the'· best· use· the land
can be put to. Plaintiff would have us value the land. a;s
pasture as this is the only use·it is presently put, to, and
this is certainly not the law, as the present potentia}r::o:Eproperty makes the 'Present market 'value,: and the 'plans:

Case,
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in this case sh-owed the adaptability of the land for .subdivision purposes and it seems immaterial to us that the
subdivision encompased other property not owned by the
defendants.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion. we desire to cite the very recent csae
from the Supreme Court of United States (decided
March 5, 1962), Thomas N. Briggs, Petitioneer vs. County of Allegheny,-------- U. S. ________ , 7 L. ed 2d 585, 82 S. Ct.
--------· It should be remembered that the 5th Amendment
to the U. S. Constitution ("nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation")
does not contain the ''damage'' clause such as is the
case in Utah.
That case held that where the County had built
an airport with use of 50% to 75% Federal funds, and
the air approach to one of the runways was over petitioner' a home, he was entitled to damages to his home
"though no part thereof was taken" (from 78-34-10 sub.
3 DCA, 1953). We have found no Federal Statute implementing the 5th Amendment, such as the case under
Utah laws and its constitution.
Respectfully submitted
Geo. D. Preston &
Geo. W. Preston
...t\.ttorneys for Defendants &
Respondents
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